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This paper is the first systematic attempt to provide an over-
view of industrial relations practices at firm level in Mozambique. 
Through a nationwide survey of firms, the paper assesses the extent 
to which specific sets of practices are associated with particular 
regions, and/or sectors, and explores the relationship between IR 
practice and national institutional realities. The survey revealed 
that informalism and autocratic managerialism characterize the 
practice of employment relations. But it would be mistaken to 
assume a convergence towards a global systematic archetype of 
low wage/low skill/low security of tenure set of practices. Instead, 
the authors conclude, contemporary Mozambique employment 
relations are an example of external market pressures being chan-
nelled and moulded by the persistence of national level realities 
that stretch back to the colonial era. In the absence of effective 
institutional mechanisms, familiar conventions are likely to persist 
because people know how these work in practice.
A central concern of the contemporary literature on industrial  relations
in Africa is with the exploration of the consequences of intensified global 
competition and the espousal of neo-liberal policies by national  governments. 
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In most cases, it is assumed that this has exacerbated existing institutional 
weaknesses, resulting in the proliferation of labour repressive policies 
 (Frynas and Wood, 2006; Moody, 1997; c.f. Hanlon, 1996). However, there 
is some evidence to suggest that, in certain cases, these pressures have been 
counterbalanced through the development of more pluralist and inclusivist 
practices at firm-level (Wood and Els, 2000; Wood and Sela, 2000). This 
paper evaluates the present state of labour relations in Mozambique, assesses 
the extent to which specific sets of practices are associated with particular 
regions and/or sectors, and explores the relationship between IR practice 
and national institutional realities. Finally, it seeks to highlight the lessons 
that can be drawn from the Mozambican experience for the analysis and 
practice of labour relations in other developing societies.
“LOW ROAD” LABOUR REPRESSION IN 
THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Global governance perspectives have argued that the growing reach 
of international organizations has meant that certain issues are governed 
across national boundaries (Haworth and Hughes, 2003: 669). However, 
it can be argued that global policy setting has been predominantly neo-
liberal in flavour, reflecting the hegemonic influence of the United States 
(ibid.: 670). Whilst in some cases the latter has been checked by powerful 
regional blocs such as the EU (Haworth and Hughes, 2003: 670), tropical 
African nations lack the capacity and resources to defy the prescriptions of 
global financial institutions such as the World Bank and—above all—the 
IMF (Hanlon, 1996). Such prescriptions centre on the opening of markets, 
reduced state interventionism, privatization, and radical labour market 
deregulation. Whilst the operations of other transnational bodies—such as 
the ILO—may have had more pluralist effects (c.f. Haworth and Hughes, 
2003), their interventions are to a much greater extent based on voluntarism 
and consent. This makes their impact rather more limited, especially in those 
contexts where enforcement of even national laws is weak. The opening 
up of markets to global competition and the weakening of national regula-
tions is likely to make for employment relations practices that are strictly 
“low road,” characterized by union-busting, poor terms of employment and
low human capital development (Moody, 1997).
“HIGH ROAD” ALTERNATIVES
Alternatively, it could be argued that, despite undeniable pressures 
towards a strengthening of the managerial prerogative and a reduction 
in security of tenure as a result of heightened global competition, and 
reduced state intervention, in certain instances, many firms have sought to 
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adopt more inclusivist policies in their relations with their employees. The 
latter may reflect a desire to develop a firm’s human capital, to enhance 
competitiveness through the espousal of functionally flexible forms of 
work organization, founded on higher levels of interdependence between 
employers and employees (Whitley, 1999; Schuman, 1998: 21).
The real strategic choices made by firms may be moulded by the uneven 
consequences of interventions by transnational bodies (see Haworth and 
Hughes, 2003: 673). Whilst the IMF remains firmly neo-liberal, certain 
World Bank interventions have accorded a great weight to human capac-
ity development (Pitcher, 2002: 214), whilst, as noted earlier, the ILO has 
tended to promote inclusivist and pluralist IR policies (ibid.: 674); even 
voluntary guidelines may have some impact in fluid socio-political envi-
ronments. Numerous case studies on manufacturing firms in neighbouring 
South Africa have indicated that a significant number have adopted higher 
value added production paradigms and union-friendly IR policies (Smith and 
Wood, 1998; Wood and Sela, 2000; Wood and Els, 2000). Such an approach 
is characterized by the use of structured workplace training, a specialized 
people management function, coherent HR planning, with employment 
relations centring on a recognition agreement with a representative trade 
union (Wood and Els, 2000). The use of such strategies has, in the South 
African context, provided an alternative—and more durable—basis of 
competitiveness to the super-numerical-flexibility / autocratic management 
paradigm (ibid.; Wood and Sela, 2000).
A variation of the “high road” paradigm is the more sophisticated 
manifestations of “hard HRM” that combine specific forms of involvement 
and participation, an emphasis on highly skilled (and externally certified) 
labour, with low security of tenure and a hostility towards unions (Guest, 
2001: 105). Such practices are typically encountered in “high tech” areas 
of the US economy, but may be gradually diffusing worldwide.
REGIONAL REALITIES AND THE PERSISTENCE 
OF NATIONAL MODELS
The above two perspectives assume that there are tendencies towards 
global convergence, whether in the direction of low value added practices, 
or the somewhat slower diffusion of high value added “best practices”, 
which may or may not be compatible with unions. However, a body of lit-
erature on the developing world suggests that the processes at work reflect 
specific choices moulded by both historical legacies and specific regional 
realities (Hyden, 1998).
Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2002: 389) argue that the underlying logics of 
action adopted by different players represent strategies guided by values 
250 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2006, VOL. 61, No 2
regarded as important, and help explain the process by which national 
systems are guided in a specific direction; homogenizing external forces 
have complex and contingent effects on employment relations. The state 
is guided by the logic of industrial peace, by the need to ensure stable 
conditions for economic growth (ibid.). In contemporary Mozambique, 
the government has very little room to manoeuvre, the ability to access 
much needed borrowing being contingent on the adoption of neo-liberal 
structural adjustment policies. The latter policies have resulted not only in 
the opening up of Mozambican markets to international competition and 
privatization, but also in dramatic reductions in state expenditure, that have, 
in turn, weakened the latter’s capacity to effectively enforce labour legisla-
tion. Labour quiescence has primarily been ensured by the “iron whip of 
hunger,” with the omnipresent threat of repeated rounds of redundancies, 
in a situation where unemployment is already extremely high.
Employers are guided by the logic of competition, by the desire to 
maximize profits (Frenkel and Kuruvilla, 2002: 388–389). The influx 
of manufactured goods from the far East, and agricultural subsidies in 
advanced societies have resulted in employers generally responding by 
cost-cutting and down sizing; this has reinforced extremely low value added 
employment relations policies, characterized by short-termism, and a lack 
of willingness to invest in plant or human resource development. Whilst 
unions are guided by the logic of employment-income protection, and seek 
to maximize income and job security (ibid.), in Mozambique, unions have 
been forced into a largely defensive role, acceding to the erosion of the 
gains in terms of real wages and conditions of employment that were made 
during the years of the socialist experiment, in return for some hope that 
jobs will be preserved.
 Similar tendencies are present throughout tropical Africa. Whilst 
it might be assumed that this would force firms in the direction of the “low 
road” model, this would discount the importance of continuities stretching 
back to the colonial era. The latter would include a legacy of autocratic 
managerial practices tempered by paternalism, the importance of per-
sonal networks both in terms of recruitment and inter-firm relationships, 
and a communitarian culture reinforced by mutual rights and obligations 
(Kamoche, 2002; Jackson, 2002; Webster and Wood, 2005). Such practices 
meld unitarist managerial strategies with emergent and innovative alterna-
tives, well equipped to withstand external shocks (Jackson, 2002).
Many explanations draw on the cultural explanations of managerial 
behaviour, based on the works of writers such as Hofstede (1980). However, 
as Bacharach (1989) notes, these theories are heavily reliant on the function-
alist tradition, which can make it difficult to explain how external shocks 
can make for ruptures and changes in national practices. Alternative, critical 
251INTERNATIONAL HOMOGENIZATION
institutionalism suggests that the problems associated with an adverse 
positioning in the global economy can be greatly exacerbated or allevi-
ated through the limitations of domestic institutional formations (Hyden, 
1998). The latter are moulded not only by external pressures, but also by 
quasi-independent action by indigenous elites, and the effects of durable 
pre-capitalist networks (Hyden, 1983, 1998). In much of tropical Africa, 
local firms lack access to a range of sources of capital, forcing a reliance on 
reinvestment and personal networks (Kimemia, 2000). Meanwhile, extended 
peasant-based networks of support permeate employment practices, allow-
ing for a certain continuity, but limiting recruitment options and constraining 
innovation (c.f. Hyden, 1983). Finally, given that such networks extend into 
state structures, as well as endemic capacity problems, enforcement of leg-
islation governing labour relations is likely to be weak and uneven (Harvey, 
2002; Hyden, 1983; c.f. Pitcher, 2002). Hence, whether or not unions are 
present, their impact on workplace practices is likely to be slight.
A reliance on personal networks is not unique to tropical Africa; it 
is, for example, also a characteristic of the guanxi-type system found in 
a number of successful far Eastern economies (Mellahi and Wood, 2003: 
378; Xin and Pearce, 1996). However, in much of tropical Africa, the 
chronic weakness of the state and associated regulatory institutions make 
firms particularly vulnerable both to the vicissitudes of global markets and 
to domestic socio-political instability. This has the effect of distorting, 
constraining and further localizing such networks, accelerating tendencies 
towards greater informalization (Frynas and Wood, 2006; Mellahi and 
Wood, 2003). Whilst the undeniably centrifugal tendencies inherent in such 
networks may be partially counterbalanced by the persistence of autocratic 
and patriarchal authority at firm level, the latter is again likely to stifle 
innovation, and make for exchange relations that are arbitrary, personal, 
and lacking in bureaucratic consistency.
In the state and export sectors, a combination of external regulatory 
weakness and patriarchal authority may contribute to the reconstitution of 
essentially Taylorist work systems. The latter are characterized by rigidly 
hierarchical lines of authority, fixed divisions of labour, limited on-the-job 
training, low levels of employee participation and involvement, and limited 
job security (Frynas and Wood, 2006). Within the indigenous small business 
and informal sector, control is exercised on personal-despotic lines, again 
characterized by a low security of tenure (ibid.; Kamoche, 2002). In both 
cases, little room is accorded to unions; at best, they are firmly subordinated 
to management. Within successful Asian economies, it has been possible to 
tailor make employment relations systems best suited to support the favour-
able integration of countries into the global economy (Haworth and Hughes, 
2003: 667). In contrast, in much of tropical Africa, institutional weaknesses 
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have resulted in national employment relations systems seeking at best 
to find a rough modus vivendi with an open and increasingly  integrated
global economy (c.f. ibid.). Invariably, reactive “coping” practices mitigate 
against the development of a supportive regulatory and human resource 
 development infrastructure (Mellahi and Wood, 2003).
THE MOZAMBICAN CONTEXT
Throughout the colonial era, the export of labour power—successively 
slaves, indentured and migrant labour—provided a major source of revenue 
for the colonizing power, Portugal (Hanlon, 1996; Newitt, 1996). Rather 
less attention was accorded to domestic development until the late nine-
teenth century. However, by the late 1960s, the country attracted significant 
foreign investment, centring on transport and related services, with Maputo 
serving as a major outlet for South Africa’s former Transvaal province, 
and Beira for the then Rhodesia (Hanlon, 1996; Newitt, 1996; BIP, n.d.). 
These developments were paralleled by limited industrial development, 
most notably in the areas of food processing, beverages, motor parts and 
textiles (ibid.).
The winning of independence in 1975 saw the Frelimo national libera-
tion movement attaining power; this was followed by the flight of most of 
the white settlers, and the adoption of state socialism. Whilst, given that 
most enterprises had been abandoned by their owners, comprehensive state 
intervention was necessary, the policies chosen were increasingly rigid, par-
ticularly in the case of agriculture and the northern regions (Pitcher, 2002: 
73–5). The then Rhodesian, and later the apartheid South African govern-
ments were able to harness the discontent of segments of the peasantry, and 
above all, traditional leaders through the establishment of the Mozambican 
National Resistance (Renamo). This led to a bloody civil war.
The cessation of hostilities between the ruling party, Frelimo and the 
rebel movement, Renamo, in 1992, and the subsequent democratic elections 
opened the way for Mozambique’s economic reconstruction. During the 
closing stages of the civil war, the end of Soviet financial aid—and looming 
economic collapse—forced Frelimo to abandon its socialist experiment, and 
turn to the IMF and the World Bank for financial support (Pitcher, 2002). 
This, however, expectedly came with stringent conditions attached, centring 
on the reduction in state expenditure, the phasing out of protective tariffs 
and privatization, and a relaxation of minimum labour standards (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1995; Hanlon, 1996). These policies had particularly 
adverse consequences for industry, education and health care (Metical,
1 August 1997; Hanlon, 1996); it is estimated that liberalization led to 
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some 116,000 redundancies over the years 1987 to 1999 (Mozambiquefile,
June 1999).
Nonetheless, a revival of the transport and service sectors led to the 
country recording significant economic growth by the close of the 1990s 
(Wood, 1999). However, most foreign investment was directed towards the 
capital, heightening existing regional disparities and the gap between town 
and country. Again, there was considerable evidence of a proliferation in 
corruption (Hanlon, 1996).
There are currently 21 unions in Mozambique, grouped into two 
 federations, the OTM and CONSILMO (Rebelo et al., 2002; Webster and 
Mosoetsa, 2001). In the 1970s, the Frelimo government established pro-
duction councils in all workplaces; in 1983, these were united into unions 
under the umbrella of the Organicao dos Trabalhadores de Mozambique 
(‘OTM’, the Organization of Mozambican Workers), but remaining firmly 
under the control of the ruling party. In 1990, OTM began to loosen its links 
with Frelimo, and has since become a persistent critic of the government’s 
economic policies (Hanlon, 1996: 78; Nhaca, 1997; Webster and Mosoetsa, 
2001). This was made possible through the government’s acceding to a 
more pluralistic approach to employment relations in line with broader 
political democratization (Pitcher, 2002: 116; Gumende, 1999: 39; Webster 
and Mosoetsa, 2001). Currently, OTM has an estimated 90,000 members. 
In 1998, the Confederation of Free and Independent Trade Unions of 
Mozambique (CONSILMO) was formed by three trade unions that had 
broken away from the OTM, representing workers in the hotel, construction 
and transport industries (World Bank, 2003).
Mozambican labour law centres on the 1998 Labour Law, which 
accords workers a degree of job security and collective bargaining rights; 
however, casual workers are not included under its provisions. This has led 
to many Mozambican firms categorizing their workers as casuals in order 
to escape the law (Levy, 2003). Again, whilst a tripartite negotiating forum, 
the Consultative Labour Commission (established in 1994) brings together 
representatives of the state, employers and unions, its principal area of 
 business is the setting of a minimum wage, with enforcement being lax.
It might seem that foreign owned firms and/or those with an export 
orientation are more likely to adopt more formalized IR strategies and prac-
tices—even more “high road” ones—than their local or domestic market 
counterparts. However, within the contemporary Mozambican context, these 
categorizations encompass much diversity. The question of foreign owner-
ship in Mozambique is a complex one. Many firms are foreign owned, or 
partially owned by foreign shareholders or a foreign company. Yet, this 
represents an extremely broad category, ranging from TNCs, to SMEs 
owned by groupings of Portuguese nationals who have strong personal or 
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family linkages with the country. The bulk of foreign owned companies 
in Mozambique fall into the latter category and are more likely to follow 
practices in line with indigenous ones, rather than leading edge interna-
tional ones. It might similarly be assumed that “high road” practices—of 
one sort or another—may be more likely to be found in export orientated 
firms. However, this would fail to take account of large companies that do 
not export particular commodities—for example, the important tourism and 
hospitality sector—that nonetheless, seek to attain global competitiveness 
in terms of both the quality of the product offered and levels of customer 
service. The same would go for recent entrants into the increasingly com-
petitive supermarket industry. Hence, it is more likely that specific sets 
of IR practices will be associated with sector rather than with ownership 
characteristics: traditionalist or “low road” practices are more likely to be 
encountered in the commercial sector, especially in SMEs (c.f. Hanlon, 
1996; Webster and Wood, 2005). Given this, for the purposes of this paper, 
we concentrated on the effects of sectoral and other factors, rather than on 
ownership patterns or market orientation. However, we recognize that a 
fruitful area of future enquiry would be to evaluate the effects of a focus 
on specific market categories, and the different types of foreign ownership 
and relationships with parent companies.
KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONAL 
EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS
The guiding logics of competition (for employers) and employment 
income protection (for employees) can result in a number of specific 
policy outcomes; employers generally seek to cut costs, but they may seek 
to enhance their competitiveness through other means, whilst employees 
may, in their responses, prioritize employment protection over income or 
vice versa (Frenkel and Kuruvilla, 2002: 389). High value added industrial 
relations practices are associated with employment relations centring on a 
recognition agreement with a representative trade union, with both sides 
keeping to negotiated rules governing workplace conduct, formalized 
mechanisms of communication, a basic security of tenure, and an envi-
ronment conducive to human capital development (Wood and Els, 2000; 
Applebaum et al., 2000; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Marsden, 1999; 
Webster and Wood, 2005). Low value added contexts would typically be 
associated with low job security, management not keeping to any collective 
agreements, a lack of communication, with little, if any skills development 
taking place (ibid.; Frenkel and Kuruvilla, 2002). Sophisticated “hard HRM 
approaches” would combine anti-union policies and weak security of tenure 
with an emphasis on effective downward communication, and ongoing 
skills development. Finally, critical institutionalist explanations of African 
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IR practice as one characterized by both rupture and continuity, would 
identify defining characteristics as centring on informality, paternalism, 
and reciprocity. Communication and training are likely to be in place, but 
to be ad hoc and unstructured, whilst employees are likely to enjoy some 
job security, given the central role of managers within informal networks 
of support (Frynas and Wood, 2006; Mellahi and Wood, 2003; Kamoche, 
2002). These differences are summarized in table 1.
In the following sections, based on survey evidence, we test which of 
the above three explanations most closely reflects the Mozambican reality. 
In the survey, respondents were asked as to the type of training system they 
used: on the job informal and uncertified, on the job formal and uncerti-
fied, on the job certified, or certified training in a dedicated organizational 
training centre or via an outside provider. In the overwhelming majority 
of cases, training was informal and uncertified, conducted on the job; in 
some cases this was supplemented by formal on-the-job training. Again, 
respondents were asked to select the type(s) of communication system they 
employed, ranging from team briefings to notice boards, to irregular general 
meetings involving the workforce; as will become apparent, most said that 
the latter was employed.
METHOD
This research centres on a survey of Mozambican firms, the sampling 
frame being compiled from the listings of commercial firms in the official
telephone directory.1 In all, some 177 firms were surveyed and the survey 
concentrated on the private sector. The response rate was high, only two 
companies refused to be interviewed, probably due to the use of face-to-
face interviews involving trained and fully briefed fieldworkers. Hence, 
the effects of any non-response bias were likely to be negligible. Interview 
respondents were the most senior person responsible for the IR/HR/ 
personnel function within the organization; interviews were typically of a 
45-minute duration.
The use of the telephone directory would exclude the informal sector,
which was not covered by the survey owing to resource constraints 
and potential difficulties in accurate sampling. Stratified sampling was 
1. The high exit rate of firms within Mozambique, and a limited number of new entrants, 
resulted in listings not being totally comprehensive or accurate. Extensive local enquiries 
eliminated those firms that ceased operations. The listing was supplemented in consulta-
tion with employer associations and the labour movement in order to ensure that newly 
established workplaces were encompassed. Excluded were very small enterprises that 
lacked a telephone and that are unlikely to be affiliated to an established employer asso-
ciation; whilst limiting the scope of the study, it is unlikely that such enterprises have 
defined industrial relations policy. 
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employed, strata being defined by geographic locale, and within each 
 geographic locale, by sector; this ensured representation of both key areas 
of industrial concentration and sector. The survey covered greater Maputo, 
and the other principal concentration of industrial and commercial activity 
in Mozambique, greater Beira. The fieldworkers were Mozambican post-
graduate students from Eduardo Mondlane University and the University 
of Witwatersrand;2 training was provided in the form of a workshop, which 
equipped the interviewers with applied skills for conducting fieldwork in 
Mozambique.3 From this data analysis is carried out, initially by simple 
observation of the distribution of various outcomes, then by estimating 
a number of probit models seeking to explain differences in employment 
relations behaviour.4
FINDINGS
A National Employment System?
The initial findings were able to establish the extent of common national 
practices within Mozambican industrial relations. Table 2 summarizes the 
degree to which specific sets of practices are associated with particular 
firms. This reveals that most firms are wedded to conservative employment 
progression; there is little to indicate the presence of islands of progres-
sive employers consistently engaging in “high value added” employment 
relations policies.
In isolation, each of the categories shows a tendency towards low-grade 
strategies amongst nearly all of the firms. Of the 101 firms responding to all 
four questions in the survey, there are only 22 with formal training, 33 using 
formal information systems and 38 being accepted as mostly abiding by 
agreements. Redundancies are less damning with only 27 firms having made 
people redundant in the last two years; however, this is still a significant
minority at over one-fourth of the total. Furthermore, redundancies, to a 
certain extent, reflect external factors, i.e. the current operating environment 
faced by the firm. Hence a firm pursuing “low value added” strategies may 
be able to expand and avoid redundancies during a period of favourable 
conditions in its specific market, with the reverse being possible for “high 
value added” firms.
2. Denise Malauene, Elize Muianga, Filipe Martins, Rachel Matavele, Crimildo Jose, and 
Eva Magumane. The financial support of the US Department of Labor is gratefully 
acknowledged.
3. The principal research assistant, Beata Mtyingizana, on a twice-weekly basis closely 
monitored the progress of the fieldworkers.
4. Full results of the probit models are available from the first author. 
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TABLE 2
Specific Practices and Firms
Formal,
Certified
Work-based
Training
No
Redundancies
in Last
2 Years
Formal
Information
Dissemination
Systems
Abide by 
Agreements
Number of 
Firms
Yes Yes Yes Yes 002
Yes Yes Yes No 006
Yes Yes No Yes 002
Yes Yes No No 005
Yes No Yes Yes 001
Yes No Yes No 002
Yes No No Yes 002
Yes No No No 002
No Yes Yes Yes 006
No Yes Yes No 009
No Yes No Yes 017
No Yes No No 027
No No Yes Yes 004
No No Yes No 003
No No No Yes 003
No No No No 010
Total 101
Consequently, by focusing upon the other three categories, i.e. those over 
which firms have much greater control, a clearer picture can be built up of the 
general view of employment relations policies held by firms in Mozambique. 
Collective analysis of these three areas is no less critical than on a selective 
basis; simple observation of table 2 reveals that the majority of firms are col-
lected within a small number of predominantly low-grade combinations; only 
a minority of firms can be seen to be pursuing genuinely pluralist policies. 
Only height firms fell into the sophisticated “hard HRM category”: making 
use of sophisticated communication systems and certified training, and yet 
they were not covered by, or ignored collective agreements.
In contrast, over one-third of firms have no formal training, no formal 
information systems and do not honour agreements, with over 75% of the 
firms choosing the “low road” strategy in at least two of the three categories. 
Thus, “high value added” employment relations policies are very much the 
exception in Mozambique.
Hence, there is a clear tendency towards low-grade policies amongst 
Mozambican firms; however it is possible that this simply reflects the 
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immediate environment in which the individual firms operate. The rise of 
neo-liberalism in the 1980s led to a challenging of the previous consen-
sus that great geographical inequalities were economically inefficient or 
socially regressive (Peck and Tickell, 1992: 355; Wood, 2004). This led 
to the scaling back of policies favouring “uncompetitive” industries and 
regions, leading to gross disparities in performance between sectors and 
locales (ibid.). In the case of Mozambique, there is little doubt that structural 
adjustment has exacerbated existing regional imbalances—in favour of the 
capital, Maputo—and proved particularly devastating to certain sectors, such 
as manufacturing (Wood, 1999; Pitcher, 2002). Again, firms of a specific 
size and structure may be better equipped to weather changes in external 
markets than others (Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997); in Mozambique, it 
has particularly been medium-sized and larger firms, and the manufacturing 
sector, that have been adversely affected by the changes that have taken 
place over the past decade (Hanlon, 1996). It is possible that such imbal-
ances have encouraged a greater diversity in employment relations and 
human resource management practices between sectors and regions, with 
firms that are particularly under threat being forced to experiment with 
innovative forms of work organization and human resource management; 
we explore this possibility in the following sections.
Security of Tenure and Investment in People
Over a quarter (28%) of firms had made employees redundant in the 
past year. In short, contrary to the predictions of the high road model, people 
are treated as a readily disposable commodity, which would also weaken 
any notions of mutual obligation. The mode of firms (69%) employed infor-
mal workplace based training, commonly the “sitting with Nellie” model, 
whereby a new worker is placed alongside a more experienced colleague, 
in order to gain practical exposure and training in the range of tasks to be 
performed. In short, we found not so much an absence of training, but a 
predominance of informal methods. Less than a fifth of firms (19%) had 
certified in-firm training programs.
A binomial probit model, with redundancies as the dependent variable 
(1 if redundancies have taken place in the last two years and 0 otherwise) 
was then constructed. The explanatory variables, in this and the subsequent
models, are the size of the firm (number of employees), regional dummies 
(Maputo and Beira, with Maputo city as the base group) and a number 
of sectoral dummies (with manufacturing other than metal as the base 
group).
All of the potential explanatory variables were insignificant with the 
exception of size. Larger firms were more likely to have made people 
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 redundant in the last two years, with region and sector being not significant; 
this would underscore the extent to which intensified global competition and 
reduced levels of state protection has forced larger enterprises to downsize 
significantly.
Based on a similar probit model, we then looked at certified workplace 
based training as the dependent variable (1 if certified workplace based 
training takes place and 0 otherwise). Again most of the variables proved 
insignificant except people working in Beira are less likely to have certi-
fied training and people in agriculture are more likely. This would reflect 
the use of certified training by a number of large agricultural enterprises 
in the region; however, as will become apparent, these enterprises are no 
more enlightened than their peers in other sectors and regions in a range 
of other areas.
Representation and Communication
The preferred method of information dissemination in the case of 77% 
of firms was through ad hoc mechanisms, such as verbal communications 
from managers at irregularly-held general meetings. Few firms (15%) made 
use of mechanisms such as cascade briefings that allowed for the structured 
flow of information from top to bottom, with some room for feedback from 
below. In short, rather than a total absence, we found that the predominant 
forms of communication are those that would be associated with traditional 
paternalist approaches to people management.
Whilst 22% made use of shopsteward or worker representative brief-
ings, in many cases, these were the same firms that made use of cascade 
briefings. Again, few firms made use of systemic forms of employee con-
sultation: only 6% made use of suggestion boxes, 4% workplace surveys 
and 15% team briefings. The survey similarly revealed little in the way 
of financial participation, other than practices associated with traditional 
piecework or jobbing systems.
We then conducted a similar probit model with information sharing as 
the dependent variable. Beira-based firms proved less likely to have formal 
information sharing systems in place; despite the higher incidence of certi-
fied training, Beira does not seem to be a locale especially associated with 
progressive employment relations policies in other areas. Again, transport 
firms were less likely to have structured information-sharing systems in 
place, reflecting the spatially dispersed nature of the industry. A similar 
pattern was apparent when it came to consultation: Beira firms were some-
what less likely to have formal mechanisms for employee consultation or 
participation in place However, there was no association between firm size 
or sector on the one hand, and employee consultation on the other hand.
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The mode of firms surveyed (36%) had no union presence whatsoever. 
However, 34% of firms had a relatively high rate of unionization, with 
more than 59% of the workforce belonging to a union; 20% of firms had 
a union presence of between 30% and 59%, whilst 10% had 29% or less 
(figure 1).
FIGURE 1
Union Penetration Rates
In covering formal sector employers, the survey encompassed what 
remains a diminishing area of employment; union penetration in other areas 
remains slight, although there is an association of market traders operating 
in the informal sector. Similarly, Mozambican unions seem to have had little 
success in reaching out to more marginal categories of labour in the formal 
sector. The survey revealed that, in only 20% of unionized workplaces, 
short term contract/casual workers belonged to a union; as noted earlier, 
many employers classify a large proportion of their workforce as casuals, 
in order to escape the provisions of the Labour Law. Unionization amongst 
part time workers was even lower; in only 4% of unionized workplaces did 
any part-timers belong to a union.
In 64% of firms, bargaining was confined to individual workplace, and 
in 22% at enterprise level. The highly decentralized nature of bargaining 
makes unions dependent on the goodwill of local managers, and on their 
capacity to weather the adverse consequences of redundancies, changes 
in recruitment and retention practices or similar managerial actions, and, 
indeed, the targeted victimization of employees who are active in the union. 
Hence, in most cases, the physical presence of unions has not made for the 
effective collective representation of workers or the erosion of managerial 
autonomy.
In 46% of workplaces, a collective agreement was in force. However, 
only 39% of managers surveyed believed that their firm actually abided by 
the agreement. This would underscore the highly decentralized nature of 
Mozambican industrial relations, and the absence of effective institutional 
restraints on managerial actions.
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A final probit model had the same explanatory variables, but with 
bargaining effectiveness as the dependent variable (1 if there is recogni-
tion and the employer satisfactorily abides by collective agreements and 0 
otherwise). In this case, all of the variables are insignificant; in other words, 
the behaviour of firms is unaffected by size, locale or sector.
In summary, the various probit models reveal that, with a small 
number of exceptions, firms’ employment relations and human resource 
management policies are shown to be independent of size, sector and 
locale. Consequently, it is evident that the predominance of specific sets 
of practices—informal communication and training, a tendency not to 
abide by collective agreements and low security of tenure reflect not only 
external pressures on specific sectors that are particularly exposed to global 
competition, but embedded national practices.
MOZAMBIQUE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: 
CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?
In Mozambique, there is little doubt that the pressures of transnational 
financial institutions and the weakness of national ones have contributed to a 
situation where a relatively large number of firms have become locked into 
super flexibility (c.f. Wood, Harcourt and Harcourt, 2004). There is little 
evidence of clusters of more progressive practices in particular sectors or 
locales, or in firms of a specific size, despite variations in the performance 
of different sectors and between firms of different sizes, and gross regional 
imbalances. There is similarly little evidence that the activities of the ILO 
have encouraged better practices; most firms ignore or avoid large bodies 
of Mozambican labour law (Levy, 2003), irrespective of whether or not the 
latter has been framed in accordance with ILO guidelines.
However, it would be mistaken to assume that Mozambican employ-
ment relations simply reflect part of a possible global convergence towards 
low wage/low skill/low security of tenure policies and practices. Rather, 
as suggested by critical institutionalism, they reflect not only international 
pressures, but also the persistence of domestic institutional structures and 
distortions. Contemporary Mozambican employment relations are at least 
partially path dependent, with external market pressures being channelled 
and moulded by national level institutional realities (c.f. Traxler, Blaschke 
and Kittel, 2001); clearly identifiable continuities stretch back to the colo-
nial era (Pitcher, 2002; c.f. Newitt, 1996). A central aspect of the latter is 
a durable informalism: management tends to be on personal and patriar-
chal, lines, in contrast to the rational-bureaucratic procedures dominant in 
advanced societies. The survey revealed that managers preferred informal 
approaches to training and communication—rather than either (high road) 
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formal procedures or a (low road) neglect—but were reluctant to have 
their freedom of manoeuvre limited by collective agreements. On the one 
hand, the type of informalism that characterizes Mozambican employment 
relations and people management is dysfunctional, making for weak and 
unstable rules governing social interactions within and between firms
(c.f. Marsden, 1999; Phelps Brown, 1983); product markets are character-
ized by cut-throat competition, and security of tenure is low. The latter 
would undermine mutual commitment, limiting the effectiveness of infor-
mal networks that, potentially, could compensate for the lack of effective 
 formal institutional mediation. On the other hand, it has made for an inherent 
 dynamism, enabling many firms—and cohorts of managers—to survive 
external shocks including rapid decolonization, a state socialist experiment, 
civil war, and neo-liberalism. Whilst employers may be guided by the
logic of competition (c.f. Frenkel and Kuruvilla, 2002), the desire to cut
costs does not necessarily result in global homogenization towards to 
the “low road” model; specific national variations persist, reflecting both 
 historical experiences, present day regulations and the nature of regulatory 
failings.
The Mozambican colonial experience was a particularly traumatic 
one, involving both the large scale use of forced labour and extremely 
lop sided development geared towards servicing the exploitative demands 
of a metropole that had itself been gradually marginalized in the global 
 economic system since its heyday in the sixteenth century. Decolonization 
was followed on by civil war, and then the imposition of poorly planned 
and largely destructive structural adjustment policies. These events—uneven
and exploitative colonial development, post-independence political 
instability, and the sweeping adoption of neo-liberal macro-economic 
 policies—mirror and magnify the experiences of many other tropical 
African states. Yet, it would be over simplistic to assume that, as a result 
of such an historical legacy, the dominant industrial relations paradigm in 
large areas of the developing world simply represents a reversion to the 
sweatshops of early capitalism; rather, such systems embody both paternal-
ism and autocracy, low security of tenure, but also informal training and 
communication and the extensive use of personal networks in areas such 
as recruitment (c.f. Webster and Wood, 2005). Future research priorities 
could include documenting varieties in such practices across the continent, 
highlighting common grounds and difference, and assessing the extent to 
which there exists a tropical African industrial relations paradigm, that is 
distinct both from the “low road” sweatshop model and higher value added 
approaches.
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CONCLUSION
The survey revealed that informalism and autocratic managerialism
characterize the practice of employment relations in Mozambique, 
 characteristics that cut across sectors, regions and firm sizes. On the one 
hand, there is little doubt that the practice of Mozambican employment 
relations has been greatly affected by external shocks; most recently, the 
implementation of structural adjustment policies has had the effect of greatly 
reducing security of tenure (Hanlon, 1996; Pitcher, 2002). Again, priva-
tization has strengthened managerial autonomy;5 within newly privatized 
firms, there has been a growing tendency to opt out of the Labour Law by 
categorizing employees as casuals (Levy, 2003).
On the other hand, the ad hoc patriarchal authoritarianism that per-
meates managerial practice represents a continuity stretching back to the 
colonial era, the socialist experiment of the 1970s notwithstanding (Pitcher, 
2002); employers continue to make widespread use of informal training 
and communication systems. It would be mistaken to assume that what is 
happening in Mozambique is simply a process of convergence towards a 
global systematic archetype of low wage/low skill/low security of tenure 
set of practices. Instead, contemporary Mozambique employment relations 
are an example of external market pressures being channelled and moulded 
by the persistence of national level realities that stretch back to the colonial 
era. As Marsden (2001) notes, any innovations will spread slowly in the 
absence of effective institutional means, with familiar conventions being 
likely to persist because people know how these work in practice, and what 
outcomes to expect.
FURTHER RESEARCH
Whilst there is an extensive body of research dealing with the nature 
and consequences of labour regulation in colonial era Mozambique (see 
Newitt, 1996; Pitcher, 1993; Saul, 1985), the survey represents the first 
systematic attempt to gauge the nature of contemporary labour relations 
practices at firm level. Hence, whilst it is possible to identify specific sys-
temic characteristics, such as informal paternalism, it is not possible to accu-
rately gauge the manner in which IR practices are replicated or abandoned, 
and the extent to which they may be converging across firms. A series of 
follow-up surveys conducted at regular intervals would be valuable in this 
5. Whilst the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s also led to unions gaining autonomy 
from the ruling party, they have generally failed to capitalize on these gains owing to a 
lack of effective legal protection and a shrinking employment base.
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regard. This would shed further light on whether the practices encountered 
in Mozambique constitute a definable systemic archetype (c.f. Katz and 
Darbishire, 2000), or simply represent a “default” cluster of incoherent 
reactions to persistent institutional and regulatory failures. Again, compara-
tive studies employing a similar measuring instrument in different national 
contexts would shed further light on the nature of, and degree of uniformity 
in, IR practices across tropical Africa, and tendencies towards convergence 
or difference within and between nations, regions and continents (c.f. Katz 
and Darbishire, 2000).
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RÉSUMÉ
L’uniformisation à l’échelle internationale ou la pérennité des 
pratiques nationales ? Le remodelage du système des relations 
industrielles au Mozambique
Cet essai se veut une tentative systématique de présenter une vue 
générale des pratiques de relations industrielles au niveau de l’entreprise 
au Mozambique. Une préoccupation centrale des études actuelles sur les 
relations industrielles en Afrique porte sur les effets de la concurrence mon-
diale accrue et l’adoption de politiques néolibérales par les gouvernements 
nationaux. Dans la plupart des cas, on postule que cela est venu aggraver 
les faiblesses institutionnelles actuelles, entraînant ainsi une multiplication 
des politiques répressives à l’endroit du travail. Néanmoins, il existe un 
minimum de preuve à l’effet que, dans quelques cas, ces pressions ont connu 
un contrepoids avec la venue de pratiques plus inclusives et pluralistes à 
l’échelle de l’entreprise.
Par contre, un certain nombre de travaux sur les pays en voie de déve-
loppement nous incite à croire que les processus à l’œuvre reflètent des 
choix spécifiques façonnés à la fois par un héritage historique et par des 
réalités régionales particulières. En s’appuyant sur une enquête à l’échelle 
nationale auprès des entreprises du Mozambique, cet essai analyse la nature 
particulière des relations industrielles au niveau de l’entreprise en cherchant 
à vérifier s’il existe une convergence dans les pratiques d’adaptation 
concurrentielles vers le haut (high road), i.e. vers une meilleure producti-
vité et de meilleures conditions de travail ou vers le bas (low road), i.e. en 
réduisant les conditions de travail, ou si un modèle de relations industrielles 
spécifiques au Mozambique persiste vraiment. L’essai cherche de plus à 
vérifier dans quelle mesure des ensembles spécifiques de pratiques sont liés 
à des régions ou à des secteurs particuliers et il tente de saisir la relation 
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entre la pratique des relations industrielles et les réalités institutionnelles 
nationales.
Au Mozambique, il n’y a pas de doute que les pressions exercées par 
les institutions transnationales et par la faiblesse des institutions nationales 
ont créé une situation où un nombre relativement important d’entreprises se 
trouvent enfermées dans un état d’hyper-flexibilité. L’enquête a trouvé très 
peu d’indices de la présence d’un amalgame de pratiques plus progressistes 
dans des régions ou des secteurs particuliers, ou encore dans des entreprises 
de taille particulière, malgré les changements au niveau de la performance 
de divers secteurs ou entre des entreprises de tailles différentes et malgré 
des déséquilibres flagrants. Dans la même foulée, il y a peu de preuve à 
l’effet que les actions de l’Organisation internationale du travail (OIT) aient 
favorisé le développement de meilleures pratiques; les entreprises ignorent 
ou évitent des pans entiers de la législation ouvrière du Mozambique, que 
les lois aient été élaborées ou non dans le respect des directives de l’OIT.
Cependant, il ne serait pas juste de postuler que les relations du travail 
au Mozambique reflètent en partie un mouvement de convergence vers des 
politiques et des pratiques de maintien en emploi caractérisées par des bas 
niveaux de salaires, de qualification et de sécurité au travail. Au contraire, 
comme semble l’indiquer l’institutionnalisme critique, les relations d’emploi 
reflètent non seulement les pressions internationales, mais également la 
pérennité des structures institutionnelles et des distorsions internes.
Les relations actuelles d’emploi au Mozambique sont au moins en  partie 
dépendantes du cheminement suivant : les pressions du marché externe 
canalisées et façonnées par des réalités institutionnelles au niveau national, 
alors que des continuités clairement identifiables s’étendent jusqu’à l’ère 
coloniale. L’aspect central de ce phénomène se traduit par une dimension 
informelle et durable des relations : la gestion tend à être personnalisée et 
patriarcale, contrairement aux procédures rationnelles et bureaucratiques 
qui dominent dans les sociétés développées. L’enquête a révélé que les 
dirigeants préfèrent des approches informelles en matière de formation et 
de communication interne, au lieu d’emprunter des procédures formelles 
(high road) ou pas de procédure du tout (low road). Ces mêmes dirigeants 
n’apprécient pas de voir leur marge de manœuvre limitée par des contrats 
de travail.
D’un côté, le caractère d’informalité qui caractérise les relations du 
travail et la gestion des ressources humaines au Mozambique n’est pas 
fonctionnel à cause des règles instables et faibles qui encadrent les interac-
tions sociales à l’intérieur des entreprises et entre ces dernières, le marché 
des produits étant caractérisé par une concurrence féroce et la sécurité 
d’emploi étant faible. Le marché va ainsi miner toute notion d’engagement 
mutuel, limitant en passant l’efficacité des réseaux informels, qui pourraient 
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 compenser l’absence d’une médiation effective,  institutionnelle et formelle. 
D’un autre côté, ce caractère d’informalité a favorisé l’émergence d’un 
 certain dynamisme en permettant à de nombreuses entreprises et à des 
cohortes de dirigeants de survivre aux contrecoups externes, incluant la 
décolonisation rapide, l’expérience d’un socialisme d’État, la guerre civile 
et enfin le néolibéralisme. De là, pendant que les employeurs peuvent être 
guidés par la logique de la concurrence (voir Frenkel et Kuruvilla, 2002), 
le désir chez ces derniers de couper les coûts ne se traduit pas par une 
uniformisation globale d’un modèle empruntant les stratégies d’adaptation 
vers le bas : des variations nationales persistent, qui reflètent une expé-
rience historique particulière, la régulation courante et les manquements 
aux règles.
Il est probable qu’on retrouve plusieurs similitudes entre les pratiques de 
relations du travail et de gestion des ressources humaines au Mozambique
et celles qui ont cours dans d’autres pays tropicaux africains. Les instru-
ments que nous avons mis au point pour cette étude pourraient servir à 
suivre l’évolution des réformes institutionnelles et aussi être utilisés pour 
des études comparatives.
